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We arguethatstrategicinteractionsbetween firms in anoligopoly can explain thepuzzling
lack of high-poweredincentivesinexecutivecompensationcontractswrittenby shareholderswhose
objective is to maximize the value of theirshares. We derive theoptimal compensation contracts
for managersanddemonstratethattheuse of high-powered incentiveswill be limited by the need
to softenproductmarketcompetition. Inparticular,when managerscan be compensated based on
theirown andtheirrivals’ performance,we show thattherewill be aninverserelationshipbetween
the magnitude of high-powered incentives and the degree of competition in the industry. More
competitiveindustriesarecharacterizedby weakerpay-performanceincentives. Empirically,we find
strongevidence of thisinverserelationshipin thecompensation of executives in theUnited States.
Oureconometric resultsarenot consistentwith alternativetheoriesof theeffect of competition on
executive compensation. We conclude thatstrategicconsiderationscan preclude theuse of high-










The separation of ownership and control of large corporations is a central feature of modern
economies. The largely unobserved choice of actions by a firm’s managers can have a major
impact on the wealth of its shareholders. The literature on principal-agent theory suggests
that the primary means for the shareholders to ensure that managers take optimal actions
is to tie managers’ pay to the performance of their firms; that is, to provide high-powered
intentives for managers to maximize the returns to shareholders. However, the empirical
literature has not found evidence of high-powered incentives. Instead, the typical finding is
a low pay-performance sensitivity, which seems to imply that shareholders are not providing
managers with incentives to maximize the returns to shareholders.
In this paper, we argue that strategic interactions between firms in an oligopoly can ex-
plain the puzzling lack of high-powered incentives in executive compensation contracts writ-
ten by shareholders whose objective is to maximize the value of their shares. We derive the
optimal compensation contracts for managers and demonstrate that the use of high-powered
incentives will be limited by the need to soften product market competition. In particu-
lar, when managers can be compensated based on their own and their rivals’ performance,
we show that there will be an inverse relationship between the magnitude of high-powered
incentives and the degree of competition in the industry. More competitive industries are
characterized by weaker pay-performance incentives. Empirically, we find strong evidence of
this inverse relationship in the compensation of executives in the United States.
We conclude that strategic considerations can preclude the use of high-powered incen-
tives, in contrast to the predictions of the standard principal-agent model. That model
posits an economic trade-off between inducing the correct amount of unobservable effort by
the agent and minimizing the amount of risk she is required to bear. In practice, that model
1predicts that managerial compensation will be correlated with the total return to sharehold-
ers, typically through ownership of shares of the firm’s stock or grants of options on the
fire’s stock. In a seminal article, Jensen and Murphy (1990) test and reject this theoretical
prediction, finding that the compensation of chief executive officers increased by ody $3.25
per $1,000 increase in shareholder wealth.1 They hypothesize that political forces (e.g.,
societal notions of fairness and equity) work to reduce the pay-performance sensitivity.2
This contrasts with our explanation that the pay-performance sensitivity is low because a
high pay-performance sensitivity would induce overly aggressive behavior in the product
markets.
Another prediction of the principal-agent model of executive compensation is that pay
should be based not only on the returns to the firm’s shareholders but on every variable that
provides unique information about the actual action taken by the manager.3 A prominent
example of such a variable is the profits of other firms in the same product market, leading
to a compensation contract based on the relative performance of the manager compared to
her rivals. The prediction from the relative performance evaluation model is that, other
things equal, an executive will receive lower compensation if executives of rival fires deliver
higher returns to their shareholders. In our model, the validity of this prediction depends on
the nature of strategic competition. When the returns to attenuating competition are high,
compensation contracts will not exhibit relative performance evaluation. When the returns
to achieving product market leadership are high, contracts will have incentives that resemble
1 Later work by Haubrich (1994) has demonstrated that some parameterizations of the principal-agent model
do allow for pay-performance sensitivities as low as the 0.003 found by Jensen and Murphy.
2 Finkelstein and Hambrick (1996) discuss the political forces that shape executive compensation in great
detail.
q This is the sticient statistic restit from Holmstrom’s (1979) work on moral hazard.
2relative performance evaluation. The empirical literature on whether relative performance
evaluation is an important source of managerial incentives finds mixed results.4 We do not
find evidence in support of relative performance evaluation in our empirical work.
The lack of empirical confirmation is a consequence of the absence of strategic con-
siderations from the standard principal-agent model, with or without relative performance
evaluation. With few exceptions, the typical principal-agent model fails to recognize that
the interaction between shareholders and managers occurs in an environment of strategic
interactions between firms in imperfectly competitive markets.5 A model that considers
compensation divorced from competition is incomplete. We show that when the optimal con-
tract allows compensation to vary with own and industry performance, strategic interactions
support relative performance pay—a negative relationship between executive compensation
and industry performanc=nly when firm outputs are strategic substitutes, as in the stan-
dard Cournot model.
When outputs are strategic complements, as in the differentiated Bertrand model of
price competition, relative performance pay lowers the shareholders’ returns by encouraging
more aggressive price setting by managers and is therefore not observed in equilibrium. In
this case, the level of compensation under the optimal contract incremes with both own
and industry performance, softening competition and raising the returns to shareholders.
d Jensen and Murphy find that relative performance is not an important source of managerial incentives.
Gibbons and Murphy (1990) test more directly for relative performance pay and find that, holding constant
the rate of return on a firm’s common stock, a higher value-weighted industry rate of retmn lowers the
growth of CEO pay.
5 The earliest papers that do recognize this interaction are Vickers (1987), Fershtman and Judd (1987),
and Sklivas (1987). Vickers (1987) demonstrate es that precommit ment to managerial incentive cent racts can
facilitate collusion between rival firms. Fershtman and Judd (1987) and Sklivaa (1987) derive similar results
by allowing the compensation contract to include sales in addition to profits. Reitman (1993) demonstrates
that the nonlinearity in profits introduced by a stock option improves the outcome for the shareholders
relative to a contract that is linear in profits. See also Katz (1991), Hermalin (1992), and Fumas (1992).
3Furthermore, the differentiated Bertrand model generates the strong prediction that the op-
timal compensation contract is sensitive to the degree of substitutability in the firm’s product
market. In more competitive industries, managers are given weaker incentives to maximize
returns to their own fires’ shareholders and stronger incentives to maximize returns to all
firms in the industry. Specifically, we show that the differentiated Bertrand model predicts
that the ratio of the own-firm pay-performance sensitivity to the industry pay-performance
sensitivity is a decreasing function of the level of competition in the industry.
We test our predictions by linking together two sources of data. We use industry concen-
tration ratios from the Census of Manufactures to characterize product market competition
and compensation data for executives of large corporations from the Standard and Poor’s
ExecuComp dataset. The prediction for the differentiated Bertrmd model is cotimed
empirically under a variety of econometric specificatiom. Our empirical results do not sup-
port the standard principal-agent model, the relative performance evaluation model, or the
Cournot model that we derive.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we derive the form of optimal executive
compensation contracts under differentiated Bertrand competition when contracts can vary
with own and industry performance. In section 3, we repeat the analysis under the assump
tion that competition is Cournot. In section 4, we demonstrate that in our model the optimal
contract is invariant to managerial risk aversion. In section 5, we describe the data that we
use for our empirical tests and, in section 6, present those findings. Section 7 discusses
the implications of our empirical resdts for alternative theories of executive compensation.
Section 8 concludes.
42. Bertrand Competition
We consider the following contracting model. There me two firms in an industry, 1 and 2,
who engage in differentialed Bertrand competition. The model has two stages. At stage
1, the owners of the firms write contracts with the managers, and at stage 2 the managers
engage in differentiated Bertrand competition.G We assume a manager’s action choice at
stage 2 is unobservable. Profits, or statistics for profits such as returns to shareholders,
are observable, so contracts can be made contingent only on profits. Firm face symmetric
demand functions given by:
e is a mean zero shock to
inferred from profits. We
(1) Dl(pl, p2) = A– bpl +ap2 +E
DQ(pl,p2) = A–@2+ap1+&
demand with variance 02. Therefore, prices cannot be perfectly
resume that b > a. That is, the manager’s action choice has a
greater impact on the demand for her own product than does her rival’s action. We assume
linear demands and two firms because this specification yields straightforward comparative
statics across product markets. The rmults of our model will generalize to industries with
more than two firms and to nonlinear demand functions so long as ~ < 0, ~ > 0, and
1*1>*-
At stage 1, if contracts are written contingent solely on own firm profits, we get the
standard differentiated Bertrand result. A contract that is increasing in own profits will
induce the manager to choose the profit maximizing price. If marginal cost is given by c, we
have the following program for the manager:
mP~ (pl – c)(A – bpl + apz + E) (2)
G Our derivation will apply to any model with strategic complements.
5(3)








Symmetric equations hold for firm 2. We can then calculate profits under this standard
differentiated Bertrand model (which we do in the proof of Proposition 1).
The question we wish to ask is, can the standard contract be improved upon? Would
the owner of firm 1 raise her profits by offering the manager
rival firm’s profits = well as the own firm’s profits? Suppose
to the manager of firm 1:
WI= kl + O!ml + prz
where
a contract contingent upon the
the following contract is offered
(5)
mi=(pi– c)(A–bpi+apj+ e). (6)
In this model, the owner of firm 1 chooses the
managers, and then the managers choose pric~.
contract, the contract is revealed to both
We ~sume that the manager of firm 1 has
a reservation wage w! and that the managerial labor market is competitive. Therefore, the
manager of firm 1 is always held to her reservation wage. The first period program for the
owner of firm 1 is:
(7)
St. WI > w; and
6The first constraint is the manager’s individual rationality constraint, which will always bind
through the choice of kl, the fixed payment in the managerial incentive contract. The second
constraint ensures that the manager’s second period action choice is optimal given the first
period contract.
We start by analyzing the second period action choice of firm 1‘s manager in the differ-
entiated Bertrand game. Explicitly, the manager’s problem is:
max a(pI –c)(A–bpl+apz+E) +~(pz–c)(A –bpz+apl+ e).
P1
Firm 1‘s reaction function is
(8)
(9)
Firm 2’s manager’s second period action choice is given by the
mn= (p2 – c)(A – bpz + apl + E)






Jointly solving both gives prices as a function of firm 1‘s first period contract.
(A+ E) (au+ 2ba + ~a) + bc (2ba + au - ~a)
P; = 4abz – aa2 – ~a2
a (A + E) (2b + a) + c (2ab2 – ~a2 + aab)
P; = 4abZ _ ~a2 _ ~a2
(11)
(12)
Substituting thwe price choices back into the owner’s first period problem and holding
the manager to her reservation wage yields the following prog-ram:
(13)
7There is a continuum of optimal contracts given





which generate expected prices of
1c(ab + 2b2 – a2) + A(a + 2b)
E~l] = j 2bz – ~z
1 –ca3 – a2A – ba2c + 2abA + 2ab2c + 4b2A + 4b3c
E~2] = ~
b (2b2 – a2)
We first establish that firm 1‘s expected prices and profits are higher under this contrac-
tual arrangement than under standard differentiated Bertrand competition. All proofs of
propositions are in the appendix.
Proposition 1 lfE~l] > c, then E~l] > E~l], E[m~] > E[nl], E~z] >
E[m2].
This establish that fim 1 would like to w-ritea contract based on
E~2] and E[m~] >
both firms’ profits
and that firm 2 benefits when firm 1 dom so. Next we establish that firm 2 would like to
offer its manager an analogous contract. We continue to consider linear contracts of the
following form:
(16)
We put no restrictions on a, ~, 6 or ~; they could be greater than 1 or less than O. We assume
each manager has a reservation wage, w~ and w~, and that the managerial labor market is
competitive. Therefore, the k’s, which are constants, are chosen so that the managers ae
always held to their reservation wages. The first period program for the owner of firm 1 is:
(17)where the constraints are w given in program 7,
We start by analyzing the manager’s second period action choice in the differentiated
Bertrand game, which is the same problem we malyzed before for firm 1. As in program 8,
the manager’s problem is:
mP~ ~(PI – c)(A – bPI + apz + E) + ~(pz – c)(A – bpz + apl + s).
As above, fim 1’s reaction function is
A+ bc+apz+c+~apz–~ac pl =
2b 2ab
and a symmetric equation holds for firm 2. The optimal price levels as functions of a, ~, 6
and ~ are:
–a(A + e)(a6 + 2~b + a~) – abc(2~b – a6 + a~) + ~a2c(6 + ~)
P; = –4~b2a + aa2y + aa26 + ~a2~ + ~a26
Substituting the price choices back into the owners’ first period problems and holding
the managers to their reservation wages yields the following program for firm 1:
A similar program holds for firm 2. Jointly solving both gives the continuum of optimal
contracts for each firm’s manager, which is:
(20)
We can now solve for the symmetric equilibrium prices, p~:
9A(2b – a) + c(b – a)(2b + a) + (2b – a)e
P: = 4b(b – a)
(21)
Proposition 2 compares expected prices and profits in the cme where both managers
can be compensated on own and rival-firm profits to the
can be compensated on own and rival-firm profits and to
compensated strictly on their own-firm profits.
case where only firm 1‘s manager
the case where both managers are
Figure 1 depicts the shift in equilibrium as we move from standard differentiated Bertrand
competition to competition characterized by compensation contracts based on own and rival-
firm profits. The upward sloping lines labelled pl and p2 are firm 1 and firm 2’s reaction
functions under standard differentiated Bertrand competition. The lines labelled p; and pj
are the reactions functions when managers can be compensated on both own and rival-firm
profits. In the new equilibrium, prices (p;, P;) are higher relative to standard differentiated
Bertrand competition.
Allowing a manager to be compensated on the rival firm’s profits lessens competition
and raises profits for both firms. Notice that the optimal contracts we derived,
are functions of a and b. The relative weight put on own firm’s profits in the optimal contract
is an increasing function of b, or the weight on own price, and a decreasing function of a, or the
weight on the rival firm’s price. The ratio b/a measures the degree of substitutability between
the two firm’s products. A higher value of b/a indicates lower substitutability, i.e., an
10industry that is closer to a monopoly. A lower value of b/a indicates greater substitutability,
i.e., an industry that is closer to perfect competition.
The optimal contracts are only identified up to their ratio, a*/~*, and not to their levels.
This is a result of the continuum of equilibria. We call this ratio the compensation ratio. As
the product market approaches a monopoly, that is
(22)
the optimal contract puts all of the weight on own-firm performance and none on rival-firm
performance. As the product market approaches the perfectly competitive outcome,
limg=l, (23)
a~b~%
the weights on both own firm and rival firm become equalized in the optimal contract. In
other words, as the products become more substitutable, more weight is put on the rival
firm’s profits to offset the increased competitive pressure.
The next step in the analysis is to consider the situation in which the principal allows
the agent to choose her contract. For example, the principal pays the agent a fixed amount
of money and allows her to allocate the funds (or some fraction thereof) between the stock
of her own firm and her rival firm. In other words we are considering the
problem and explicitly accounting for strategic effects on portfolio choice.
the agents now choose a, ~, 6 and ~. The problem for firm 1‘s owner is:
m~= E[7r~]– WI
St. WI = kl + CXrl+ ~~2 z w; and
Q“,P“ c arg~-l WI




(24)A symmetric problem holds for firm 2. k will be chosen so that the IR constraint is
met with equality. Therefore, we only need consider the agent’s problem. The information
structure here is important–the manager of firm 1 chooses her
that the manager of firm 2 chooses her contract, the contracts
firms compete (prices are chosen). Price competition yields the
contracts as we derived for Proposition 2.
contract at the same time
are revealed, and then the
same prices w functions of
The manager of firm 1 chooses a and @ to maximize
given the prices above and symmetrically for the manager of firm 2. The symmetric equilib-
rium contracts are a“ = r, ,f3°= r, ~“ = t, 6“ = t, r, t E R+. If we choose ~“ = ~“ (the
contract from Proposition 2), i.e., r = y, then
2b–a
Q“=T<- a y= ~”. (26)
Allowing the agent to choose the contract further softens price competition. Given these
contracts, Proposition 3 shows that prices and profits are higher when the manager picks
her contract (or allocates her portfolio) than when the owner chooses the contract for the
manager.
Proposition 3 If ~~~] > c, then EM] > E~~] and E[m~] > E[TT] foT i E [1, 2].
Competition is further softened because now the managers fully internalize their com-
petitive externality. Shareholders cannot commit directly to maximizing industry profits
12because this is not credible-they can only commit to maximizing their own wealth. Letting
managers choose their contracts indirectly commits firms to maximizing industry profits.
Both managers choose contracts and then prices to mtimize industry profitability, Because
prices are strategic complements, higher prices increase joint profits, which then increase the
manager’s payoff.
In summary, we might expect to see compensation contracts based on own and rival-
firm profits when firms engage in differentiated Bertrand competition. Relative to standard
differentiated Bertrand competition, such compensation contracts soften competition. How-
ever, firms do even better by allowing managers to allocate their wealth across the equity
of their own firms and their rivals. As long w managers hold some of the equity in their
own firm, they will also choose to hold equity in their rival and further attenuate Bertrand
competition. Thus, it is not a requirement to observe explicit provisions regarding own and
rival-firm profits in managerial contracts. The manager can be relied on to make optimal
portfolio allocations.
3. Cournot Competition
Now we consider the same model as before but where the market is characterized by Cournot
competition instead of Bertrand competition. The demand structure is:
D(ql, qz) = A – b(ql + qz) + & (27)
The standard Cournot solution obtains if the manager is strictly compensated on own-firm
profits. It is given by:
mqy 9i(A–~(q2+ qj)+E– c)” (28)
















Next we consider contracts contingent upon rival-firm profits M well as owr-firm profits.
First we look at the case in which only the manager of firm 1 is compensated on the rival
firm’s stock price in addition to her own share performance. We consider linear contracts of
the following form:
WI = kl + Qrl + ~TZ (32)
We also assume that contracts me bounded:
a,p E [–M, M], M<m. (33)
We now proceed as we did before in the Bertrand ewe. The first period program for the
owner of firm 1 is:
14Thesecond period action choice of firm l’smanager is given by:
m~~ aql(A–b(ql +q2)+&– c)+~q2(A –b(q1+q2)+&– c).
The reaction function for the manager of firm 1 is:
1aA – abq2 + ~E – ~C – @q2b ql=j
ab




Jointly solving both yields:
A–c+E -.
Substituting these quantity choices back into firm





1‘s owner’s first period problem and
following program:
:7 E[q; (A – b(q; + q;) – C + E)] – u;. (39)
The solution to this program is given in the following proposition:
Proposition 4 There is a continuum of optimal contracts in which a’ = y, F = –y, y l
[-M, O)U (o, M]. For uzzy~, VI c [-~, O)U (o,~], ~[q~k] = E[g~l], E[T~~] = E[~~~], E[qi~l =
E[q;l] and E[m~~] = E[mjl]. Therefore, we have unique quantities and pagofls E[q{], E[n[],
E[q~] and E[n~]. Relative to the Coumot payofls and quantities we have E[q{] > E[ql],
E[n~] > EIzI], E[q~] < E[q2] and E[n~] < E[7rz].
This leads to firm 1 becoming a Stackelberg leader and firm 2 becoming a Stackelberg
follower. Profits are higher for firm 1 when its manager is compensated on
than when she is compensated solely on own-firm profits. Note that the
both firms’ profits
optimal contracts
15can be decomposed into two types: those in which the manager of firm 1 is given a long
position in her own firm and a short position in the rival and those in which the manager
is given a short position in her own firm and a long position in the rival. While both
are theoretically possible, legal constraints prevent a manager from shorting her own firm.
Section 16(c) of the Securiti- Exchange Act of 1934 prohibits insiders from maintaining
short positions in equity securities.7 Hansen and Lott (1995) demonstrate that no such
constraints exist on taking a short position in a rival firm. We thus refer to the contract in
which the manager of a firm is given a long position in her own firm and a short position in
her rival as the equilibrium contract.
Next we consider if firm 2 is better off by also adopting such a contract. The contract
specification is again linear:
We assume that:
~,o,7,~ E [–M,M].
The fire’s first period optimization is:
St. WI > w; and
(40)
(41)
7 According to SEC Document No. S7-26-88, “A reading of the legislative history indicates that Congress
did not want insiders, with access to inside information, speculating in their company’s stock by acquiring
short positions. Further, Congress did not want insiders to take short positions in conflict with their fiduciary
duties, because insiders could use short positions to manipulate a stock price or to profit by a fall in the
price of their company’s stock.”
16A s~metric program holds for firm 2. Firm 1‘s manager’s second period action choice is
given by:
max aql(A– b(ql +qz) +E – c) +@qz(A – b(ql +qz) +s– c).
91
The reaction functions are:
and optimal quantity levels are:
(42)
(43)
Substituting these quantity choices back into the owner’s first period problem and holding
the manager to her reservation wage yields the following program:
rn~ E[q; (A – b(q; + q;) + &– c)] – W;. (44)
A similar program holds for firm 2. Jointly solving both gives the Nash equilibrium optimal
contracts for each firm’s manager.
Proposition 5 There are two continua of pure strategy asymmetric Nash equilibria. In
the first continuum, al* = r, @l* = –r, ~1” = t,61* = O, and r,t 6 [–M, O) u (O,M].
For all rk, Tl, t G [–M, O) U (O,M], E[q]~] = E[q~~], E[m~~] = E[~~;], E[q~~] = E[qj~] and
E[T~~] = E[n~~]. In the second continuum, a2* = u, ~2” = 0, ~2* = v, 62* = –v, and
U,V E [–M, O)U(O, M]. FOT a~luk,vl,u E [– M, O) U(O, M], E[q?~] = E[qfT], E[~f~] = E[T?T],
E[q~~] = E[q~~] and E[T~~] = E[~~~]. Therefore, we have unique quantities and payofls E[q~*],
E[~~*], E[q~*] and E[nfi*], e G {1,2} associated with each continuum of equilibria, In all of the
pure strategy Nash equilibria, one firrR is a Stackelberg leader and the other is a Stackelberg
follower. Joint quantities are higher and joint profits lower than in the standard Cournot
model.
17As in the previous proposition, within each continuum we can decompose contracts into
two types: those in which the manager is given a long position in her own firm and a short
position in the rival and those in which the manager is given a short position in her own
firm and a long position in the rival. Again, we will refer to this first type of contract as
the equilibrium contract. The optimal contracts exhibit short-selling of the rival by one of
the fires, who becomes the Stackelberg leader; that is, either ~“ or 6* is negative. The
Stackelberg follower has a long position in her own firm and no position in the rival (this is
again the result of legal prohibitions against short selling of one’s own firm).
It is worth noting the differences between our results and those of Fershtman and Judd
(1987) and Skliv~ (1987). Fershtman and Judd and Sklivas consider contracts in which the
manager is compensated on a linear combination of own-firm profits and sales, and not on
rival-firm profits. They show that quantities are higher and profits are lower than in the
standard Cournot model. However, their models generate a unique equilibrium that does not
have Stackelberg behavior. Our model has continua of asymmetric pure strategy equilibria
in which the firms do exhibit Stackelberg behavior. Asymmetry is a natural feature of our
model and characterizes a richer set of possible outcomes for the Cournot c~e.
In our model, shorting one’s rival resembles relative performance evaluation. The man-
ager does get compensated on the difference between her firm’s performance and that of
the rival firm. However, what looks like relative performance evaluation is not the result of
the owner’s need to provide the agent with incentives to supply effort while filtering out the
common shock 6. Instead, what appears to be relative performance evaluation arises because
the owner wants to toughen competition–it is a strategic choice rather than a response to
moral hazard.
Next we ask the question of whether the owner would prefer to let the manager choose
18the contract, as
~. The problem
we did in the Bertrand case. Again, this means the agents pick o, ~, 6 and
for firm 1’s owner is:
(45) m~~ E[nl] – WI
St. WI = kl + crml + ~7r2 2 w{ and
~“,D“ G arg Inl WI
,
9Y l mg mq~ wl(~”, B“, v“, 6“).
A symmetric problem holds for firm 2. k will be chosen so that the IR constraint is met
with equality. Therefore, we only need consider the manager’s problem. The manager of
firm 1 chooses her contract at the same time that the manager of firm 2 chooses her contract,
the contracts are revealed, and then the firms compete (quantities are chosen). Quantity
competition yields the same quantities as functions of contracts as we derived in equations
43.
The manager of firm 1 chooses a and ~ to maximize
given the quantities above and a symmetric equation holds for the manager of firm 2.
Proposition 6 Consider equilibria in pure strategies. The equilibria are:
ay=M, p;= M,’y; =M,6; = –Mand~~=Mj@~=–M,~~=M,6~=M.
(46)
(47)
In the jirst equilibrium, firm 1 does not produce and firm 2 produces at the monopoly level.
In equilibrium 2, firm 2 does not produce and jirm 1 produces at the monopoly level. The
expected payoff to both managers is E[w~] = ka+ ~ (A +s – C)2~, i ~ {1, 2}.
19These contracts lead one firm to be the monopolist andtheother to stay out, but the
manager of the firm that stays out gets compensated anyway.8 Allowing the managers to
choose their contracts makes them less competitiveone firm becomes the monopolist and
both managers take long positions in
not produce is made worse off in this
that firm. Clearly the owner of the firm that does
situation–such an owner would prefer not to let her
manager choose her own contract. On the other hand, each owner would like to induce her
manager to produce at the monopoly level. One way to achieve this is to give a manager a
sticiently large stake in her own firm so that she cannot take an equally large long position
in her rival. In this case, the best the manager can do is to short her rival, thus committing
the manager to produce aggressively and to become either a monopolist (as in Proposition
6) or a Stackelberg leader (w in Proposition 5).
Next we consider what happens when one firm lets the manager choose her contract and
the other firm uses no contract. The quantity functions are:




The manager of firm 1 maximizes WI = kl + Onl + ~7r2.The optimal contract turns out to
be a = @ = z, z E (O,M]. We conclude that if one firm wants to let its manager choose her
contract, the other firm would not want to let the manager choose her contract. The firm in
which the manager does not choose earns monopoly profits, and the manager who chooses
does not produce.
Next we consider what happens when one manager chooses her own contract and the
s One thing to notice about the equilibria in this case is that there are ordy two pure strate~ equilibria,
rather than two continua of equilibria which we identify generically with the same payoffs as in Proposition
5.
20other firm dictates a contract. The quantity functions are:
A+&–c




Firm 1 chooses the contract for the manager and firm 2 lets the manager choose. The
optimal contract in this c~e is: 6 =? = M,a = z,~ = –Z, Z E (O,M]. This leads to
another continuum of equilibria. Firm 1 can choose any contract where a = z, ~ = –z and
get a monopoly
These cases
position. Firm 2, by letting the manager choose, does not produce.
demonstrate that there remains a strategic role for relative performance
evaluation. We expect to see both firms choosing contracts for their managers. This is
the situation analyzed in Proposition 5. One manager’s contract will consist of aggressively
short-selling the rival, i.e., there will be a contract that resembles relative performance
evaluation for that manager. The other firm will select a standard compensation contract
consisting of a long position in the manager’s own firm.
4. Risk Aversion
Thus far we have assumed that the manager is risk neutral. In this section, we show that
the analysis is unchanged if the manager is risk averse. This property is the consequence of
our assumption that there is no disutility to the agent’s action choices. To see this, recall
that throughout the paper, the principals have solved programs of the following form:
21(50)
In order to show that risk aversion does not matter, we need only show that the optimal
action choice Zi does not change when the manager is risk averse. This is because the
principal is risk neutral in either case, and so a and ~ will be chosen optimally given Zi and
kl is chosen so WI = w;. The optimal z; in the problem above is given by the solution to:
(51)
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The same argument holds when the manager chooses a and Q, i.e., the manager chooses the
contract or her portfolio.
A simple contract that implements z: when the agent is risk averse is the following.
We interpret a and @ w the fractions of shareholdings in firm 1 and 2 respectively for the
manager of firm 1. Let r be a constant that scales the number of shares held in each firm
by the manager of firm 1. Then the owner of firm 1 solves the following program:
max E[n~] – w~
~,p,kl,r
St. WI = u (y) ~ w; and
xi l argmm WI where
~1
u’ > 0, U’l <0 and
y = k~ + 7-(a7r~(z~,z~) + ~7r~(z~, z~))
The solution is to choose a’ = argm=a E[nl] – w{ as above, kl = u-l (wj), and to let
r ~ O. As T is chosen arbitrarily small, the agent is directly paid her reservation utility,
bears vanishing risk, and chooses the optimal z;. This is the least-cost way to implement
the optimal action.
5. Data
The models of sections 2 and 3 yield testable implications regarding the relationship between
product substitutability and the sensitivity of executive compensation to firm performance.
We combine data from two separate sources to explore this relationship empirically. Our
data on compensation
database. Our data on
are
the
drawn from the Standard and Poor’s Compustat ExecuComp
product market substitutability across different firms are drawn
from the Censuses of Manufactures conducted by the Commerce department. This section
describes each of these data sources in turn.
235.1 Executive Compensation Data
The ExecuComp dataset compiled by Standard and Poor’s includes data on total compensa-
tion for the top five executives (ranked annually by salary and bonus) at each of the firms in
the S&P 500, S&P Midcap 400, and S&P SmallCap 600.9 In addition to measures of short-
term compensation such as salary and bonus, ExecuComp centains data on components
of long-term compensation such as long-term incentive plans, restricted stock, and stock
appreciation rights. Due to enhanced federal reporting requirements for fiscal years ending
after December 15, 1992, the ExecuComp data for 1993 and 1994 are virtually complete. 10
Relative to the dat=ets used in the studies by Jensen and Murphy (1990) and Gibbons and
Murphy (1990), the advantages of the ExecuComp data are that its sample encompmses the
largest 1500 fires each year and is not restricted to just chief executive officers. The main
disadvantage is that its panel dimension for payments to executives is limited to only two
years at present.
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics on the components of executive compensation for
all executiv= in the ExecuComp sample for 1994 for whom complete data on total com-
pensation is available. The top panel of the table pertains to the 1,490 executives who are
identified as the chief executive officer of the fire. The bottom panel describes the other 6,146
executives in the sample. Our measure of total compensation can be divided into short-term
compensation and long-term compensation. Short-term compensation consists of salary,
bonus, and other annual payments (e.g., gross-ups for tax liabilities, perquisites, preferential
g ExecuComp isthepubliclyavailable ve~ionof thedatathathavetraditionally beenusedto tabulatethe
annual Business Week executive compensation scoreboards. See Byrne (1996) for the most recent scoreboard.
10There me sever~ data items that did not have to be disclosed (e.g. other annual compensation, all
other compensation) for fiscal years ending before December 15, 1992. Prior to that, disclosure was at the
company’s discretion. Hence, although we do have some data extending back to 1991, we focus only on the
years for which we know that the set of firms reporting all the components of compensation is representative.
24discounts on stock purchases). Annual short-term compensation averages $973,000 for the
CEOS and $454,000 for the Non-CEOs. Long-term compensation includes the value of re-
stricted stock granted, stock options granted, payouts from long-term incentive plans, and all
other compensation (e.g., contributions to benefit plans, severance payments). The sample
averages of long-term compensation are $1,045,000 for CEOS and $381,000 for Non-CEOs.
In the aggregate, long-term compensation accounts for 51.8 percent of CEO compensation
and 45.6 percent of Non-CEO compensation. At the individual level, the average share of
compemation that is long-term is 35.0 percent for CEOS and 32.1 percent for Non-CEOs,
reflecting the skewness in the distribution of long-term compensation. Stock options granted
are by far the most important component of long-term compensation, accounting for 72.9
percent for CEOS and 68.8 percent for Non-CEOs.ll
5.2 Product Market Data
Our model links the compensation contract to properties of the demand curve for a firm’s
products. Specifically, in the differentiated Bertrand model from Section 2 with linear de-
mand curves, the compensation contract is a fiction of the ratio b/a, where the numerator
(denominator) is the slope of the demand curve with respect to the firm’s (rival’s) price. A
firm in an industry in which there is little product differentiation will have a low ratio. Our
theory predicts that the compensation of executives in such an industry will be insensitive
to changes in own performance relative to rival firm performance. Compensation becomes
more sensitive to own-firm performance relative to rival-firm performance as product differ-
entiation (and the ratio b/a) increases.
Since we do not have estimates of the parameters of demand functions at the level of the
llThe value of stock options granted is estimated by a proprietary modified Black-Scholes formula. See
Standard and Poor’s (1995) for a discussion.
25firm or even the industry, we proxy for the degree of substitutability that a firm’s product
faces with the firm’s industry concentration ratio. We conjecture that a firm in a more
concentrated industry will have fewer close substitutes for its products. This assumption is
consistent with a framework such as that of Salop (1979), in which firms in each industry
have located optimally in the product space to maximize the distance between competitors.
In such a model, industries with more firms will have greater product substitutability and
lower concentration ratios.
Our source of data on concentration ratios by industry is the 1992 Census of Manu-
factures, conducted by the Bureau of the Census as part of the quinquennial Economic
Censuses.12 Within the manufacturing sector are the twenty 2-digit standard industrial
classification (SIC) codes from 20 to 39, and within these 2-digit SICS are 458 separate 4-
digit SICS (ranging from 2001 to 3999). For each SIC, the Census contains five measures of
industry concentration: the 4, 8-, 20-, and 50-fim ratios and the Herfindahl index. Denot-
ing a firm’s share of the total value of shipments in the industry by (i and ordering the firms
from the largest share to smallest, an industry’s Herfindahl index is:
The restriction of the Herfindahl to the largest 50 firms is a convention of the Census of
Manufactures.13
Table 2 presents the average concentration ratios for each of the 2-digit SICS within
12The data and documentation of the concentration ratios for 1992 are found in BUeau of the Cemus
(1996). More complete documentation of the concentration ratio series through 1987 is found in Bureau of
the Census (1993). The Economic Censuses for other sectors of the economy do not include concentrate ion
ratios and so are excluded from our empirical analysis.
131n the few SICs in which the HerfindaN index is missing, we impute the value from the other concentration
ratios by assuming that the shares of the firms within each group (i.e. 1-4, 5-8, 9-20, 21-50) are equal, This
procedure will always underestimate the Herfindahl index.
26the manufacturing sector. Each cell in the table weights the concentration ratio of the
constituent 4-digit SICSin proportion to their value of shipments. There is wide variation in
average concentration across these broad industry groups. In our empirical work, we use the
Herfindahl index as our measure of industry concentration, although our qualitative results
are invariant to the particular measure of concentration that we use. We believe that the
Herfindahl best captures the impact of both the number of firms and their relative market
shares on the degree of product substitutability in an industry.
It is worth noting that although we use the concentration ratio m a prow for the sub-
stitutability of products between firms in a market, the correspondence between SIC codes
and product markets is not perfect. Even at the 4-digit level, some industries may include
several products that are not themselves close substitutes for each other. This aggregation
tends to understate the true concentration ratio for a firm’s product, possibly by different
amounts in different industry classifications. This consideration must be balanced against
another data limitation; namely, that many firms have products in several 4-digit industries,
but the firm’s top executives are typically responsible for all of them, and the firm’s financial
statements reflect its overall performance. Conducting the analysis with more disaggregated
industry classifications would exacerbate this problem. 14
141n OUT~mPirical work, we we the Compustat “principal products” SIC code for the firm’s largest business
segment. For some firms in which this is given only at the 2- or 3- digit level, we impute the concentration
data for the 2-digit SIC average.
276. Empirical Results
Our model specifies executive compensationm a linear combination of own and rival-firm
profits:
WI = kl + anl + ~7rz (56)
Note that Q and ~ also represent the own and rival-firm pay-performance sensitivities in this
linear compensation contract. The main prediction from the differentiated Bertrand model
is that the relative weight of own profits relative to rival firm profits-the compensation ratio
(a/~) -should be a decreasing function of the degree of substitutability between the two firms’
products. In other words, M products become more substitutable (markets become more
competitive), an executive’s pay will depend less on her own firm’s performance and more
on the performance of rival firms. In contrast, the main prediction of the Cournot model is
that executive compensation hm a constant own-firm pay-performance sensitivity regardless
of the degree of competition in the product market. In this framework, a is positive and @
is negative or zero. To the extent that rival firms’ performance matters, better rival firm
performance decreases executive compensation.
As discussed above, we make two simplifying assumptions to test our theory empirically.
The first is that the firm’s rivals are the set of firms who also have their principal business
in the same 4-digit SIC code (Below, we will also consider more aggregated industrial clas-
sifications at the 3- and 2-digit levels). The second is that the degree of substitutability in a
firm’s product market can be proxied by the concentration of the firm’s industry. In order
to estimate pay-performance sensitivities, we specify both parameters of the compensation
28contract as linear functions of the percentile of the firm’s industry in the distribution of
concentration ratios:
(57)
where F(H) is the empirical curntiative distribution function (calf) of the Herfindahl index
across 4-digit SICS. F(H) will equal zero (one) at the minimum (maximum) observed
industry concentrations in our sample.15 We use the cdf of H as a convenient normalization
that allows for e~y interpretation of the parameters, ~k, in a regression specification. Note
that when the firm’s rivals are alternatively defined m all firms within the same 3-
SICS, we continue to use the Herfindahl for the 4-digit SIC to characterize the
product substitutability the firm faces.




cross-section of industries: ql >0, q2 <0, and q3 = 7j14 = O.Alternatively, the prediction for
the Bertrand model will be empirically confirmed if the compensation ratio is an incre~ing
function of the Herfindahl index:
>0 (58)
where ~(H) is the probability density function associated with F(H). Since f(H) is a
positive number independent of the parameters, qk, it can be divided out of both sides of
the inequality, leaving:
lsIn our sample, the Herfindahl for the leaat concentrated industry is 15, i.e., F(15) = O. Additionally, the




(~z + q4F(H))2 > 0“
(59)
Equation 59 is a single nonlinear restriction on the parameters of a linear regression
which we fully specify below in equation 65.16 The test statistic is therefore distributed
asymptotically as:




and ~ (q) is the estimated varianc~covariance matrix of the parameters. Note that each
term in the test-statistic depends on the value of F(H). In our empirical work, we test the
null hypothesis for values of F(H) corresponding to 0.25, 0.50, and 0.75.
In our oneperiod model from sections 2 and 3, we referred to nj as the “profits to firm
j.“ In practice, the appropriate variable to use is the total dollar returns to shareholders–
including capital gains and dividends but net of inflationan their holdings at the beginning
of the period. This is the concept underlying the measures of performance used by Jensen
and Murphy (1990). Own performance for firm ‘j’ is defined as:
where pjt is the total ifiation-adjusted return to shareholders and Wj)t_l is the beginning
of period market value of firm ‘j.’ In our dataset consisting of large firms in 1993 and 1994,
lGR(q)is also equalto ~d~~~).
30the mean and median values for
dollars), respectively. We define
Wj,~-l are $3.3 billion and $874 million (in constant 1994
the total itiation-adjusted return to shareholders of rival
firms as:




where the summation is
datmet, the 25th, 50th,
taken over all firms excluding firm ‘j’ in the same SIC code. In our
and 75th percentiles of pjt and p-j,~ are {-12.67Y0, 5.40%, 26.76%}






Rival firm performance is therefore the hypothetical dollar returns to shareholders of firm
if it experienced the value-weighted average return of other firms in its industry. Studies
relative performance evaluation
a regression for compensation.
components separately and, second,
typically include ~~t– n~~as an explanatory variable
We extend that framework first by including the two
by allowing both pay-performance sensitivities to vary
across industries in proportion to their concentration ratio. Accordingly, we estimate the
following equation:
Wijt = qln~t + q2mjt + ~3F(Hj)m~t + V4F(Hj)n~t + (65)
39 94
k=20t=93
In this equation, the executive ‘i’ works at firm ‘j’ in year ‘t.’ The dependent variable
is compensation (in constant 1994 dollars), and the first four independent variables are own
and rival firm performance, alone and interacted with the cdf of the Herfindahl index. The
31regressions also include the cdf of the Herfindahl itself and an indicator variable that is
equal to one if the executive is a CEO and zero otherwise. The remaining terms, denoted
by ~j~t, are indicator variables for whether fim ‘j’ is in the 2-digit SIC ‘k’ in year ‘t. ’17
The inclusion of these indicator variables
age pay-performance sensitivities between
ensures that it is not the variation in the aver-
2-digit industry groups but the variation in the
pay-performance sensitivity within those groups that identifies the estimated coefficient. In-
cluding the industry effects also controls for any other factor such as a macroeconomic shock
that varies across broad industry groups but not within the narrow industries that comprise
them. Note that we cannot estimate the model with a more disaggregated fixed effect (e.g.,
at the level of the firm or the executive) because our memure of the Herfindahl index does
not vary across executives in a given firm or over the two years of data in the sample.
Table 3a presents the estimates of equation 65 with total compensation as the dependent
variable. In all specifications, executive compensation is denominated in thousands and firm
performance is denominated in millions of constant 1994 dollars. The fist column pertains
to a regression in which the firm’s rivals are all other firms in the sample with the same 4-
digit SIC code. The first coefficient shows that an executive’s total compensation incremes
by 0.11 cents for every thousand dollars of incremental shareholder wealth per year in an
industry that hm the minimum industry concentration (i.e., the one for which F(H) = Oand
is therefore the most competitive). The third coefficient shows that this pay-performance
sensitivity increases by another 7.92 cents per thousand as industry concentration incremes
from the least to the most concentrated. Thus, the pay-performance sensitivity is 8.03 cents
per thousand at the maximum industry concentration (i.e., the one for which F(H) = l)).
The second and fourth coefficients show that the rival pay-performance sensitivity is 32.66
lTOne of the ~j~t terms is omitted from the regression to avoid linear dependence among the explanatory
variables.
32cents per thousand in the least concentrated (i.e., most competitive) industries and declines
to 32.66– 34.10 = – 1.44 cents per thousand in the most concentrated (i.e., least competitive)
industries. The rival pay-performance sensitivity changes from positive to negative at the
96th percentile of the Herfindahl index distribution. As shown in the table, at the median
industry concentration, the own pay-performance sensitivity is 0.11+ 0.50*7.92 = 4,07 cents
per thousand and the rival pay-performance sensitivity is 32.66 – 0.50* 34.10 = 15.61 cents
per thousand. In their estimates of the pay-performance sensitivity, Jensen and Murphy
(1990) found that for total compensation, the pay-performance sensitivity was 3.29 cents
per thousand.la The result that the rival pay-performance sensitivity is positive rather
than negative over almost the entire distribution of industries is inconsistent with models
such as Gibbons and Murphy (1990) which emphasize relative performance evaluation. This
result also contradicts the predictions of the Cournot model that we derived in section 3.
be
to
Although our model abstracts from all other factors that might cause one executive to
paid more than another, in actual data we have to allow for these factors. In addition
the full set of 2-digit industry and year interactions, we also include the percentile of
the Herfindahl index itself and a dummy variable that takes on a value of one if the exec-
utive is a CEO and zero otherwise. Including the cdf of the Herfindahl allows for the level
of compensation to be different in more concentrated industries, independent of own and
rival performmce. The fifth row in the table shows that total compensation incremes by
approximately $38,000 for every decile incre~e in the distribution of the Herfindahl index.
Including the indicator variable is motivated by the differences in the level (more so than in
the composition) of executive compensation revealed in Table 1. The last coefficient shows
18JenSen and Murphy (lggo) had a longitudinal sample of CEOS from large corporations. Their measure
of total pay used in this comparison did not include the value of stock options granted. Additionally, they
used the change in compensation as their dependent variable, whereas we control for broad industry effects.
33that CEOS receive approximately $1 million more in total compensation than do non-CEOs,
a number that is similar to the unconditional difference shown in Table 1.
The bottom panel of the table presents the tests of the nonlinear restriction on the pa-
rameters {ql, q2,q3,q4} specified as R (q) >0 that is implied by our differentiated Bertrand
model. In the first entry, where the value of F(H) is set equal to 0.25, the value of the re-
striction is 0.4504 and the test statistic is 15.4154. Since the test statistic is asymptotically
distributed chi-square with one degree of freedom, the null hypothesis that the compensation
ratio is not increasing with H is strongly rejected with a p-value of 0.0001. The null hy-
pothesis is similarly rejected for F(H) = 0.50 and rejected at the 4 percent significance level
for F(H) = 0.75. The higher p-values at higher percentiles indicate that we can have less
confidence that the compensation ratio is still increasing with respect to industry concentra-
tion once industries have become highly concentrated. The strong results for the hypothesis
tests can be traced to the pattern of signs on the estimates for {ql, q2,q3,q~}. A sticient
but not necessary condition for R (q) >0 to obtain is that qd be negative and ql, qz, and qa
be positive. This condition will result in ~ >0 and ~ <0, which in turn will guarantee
that the compensation ratio is increasing in H.
The second and third columns of Table 3a extend the definition of the rival firms to
those in the same 3-digit and 2-digit SICS, respectively. The second column shows that
when the 3-digit SIC is used, the parameter estimates, median pay-performance sensitivities,
and hypothesis tests are similar in magnitude and significance to those in the 4-digit SIC
specification. The third column shows that when the 2-digit SIC is used, q3 is negative
(though with only marginal significance). Given the magnitudes of the other parameters,
this is enough to make the restriction on the own and rival-firm pay-performance sensitivities
insignificantly negative rather than significantly positive. It is not surprising that the model
34fails under such a broad definition of the firm’s rivals. It is unlikely that strategic interactions
between firms are as important at the 2-digit level as they are at the narrower 4-digit level.lg
Table 3b presents the estimates of the same three regressions using short-term compen-
sation as the dependent variable. The results are very similar to those in Table 3a. When
the rivals are defined at the 4-digit or 3-digit SIC level, the ndl hypothesis that the com-
pensation ratio does not increase with industry concentration is strongly rejected. Unlike
the regressions for total compensation, there is no industry concentration level at which the
rival-firm pay-performance sensitivity is negative. At the median industry concentration,
the own and rival-firm pay-performance sensitivities are 3.21 and 4.11 cents per thousand,
respectively, for the 4-digit SIC rivals and 3.19 md 5.23 cents per thousand for 3-digit SIC
rivals. These results are somewhat higher than Jensen and Murphy’s (1990) range of esti-
mates from 1.35 to 2.19 cents per thousand for salary plus bonus. When the definition of
rivals is extended to the 2-digit SIC level, the restriction value is again negative though not
statistically significant.
The skewness of the distribution of many of the components of executive compensation
documented in Table 1 raises the possibility that the results in Table 3 are being unduly
influenced by outliers. Tables 4a and 4b estimate the same specifications from Tables 3a
and 3b using median regression. Because median regression minimizes the sum of absolute
deviations rather than the sum of squared deviations, it is less sensitive to outliers than is
ordinary le=t squares. Using this method, the estimates for each of the six specifications
provide stronger support for the predictions of our differentiated Bertrand model: all of
the test statistics are positive and significant below the 0.1 percent significance level, in-
191t isnoteworthy thatGibbonsandMurphy(1990)found larger negative effects in broader industry groups
in their estimates of a relative performance evaluation model.
35eluding those for the 2-digit SIC definition of rivals, which were previously negative and
insignificant.20 The parameter estimates for {ql, q2,q3,q4} are typically more positive than
in Table 3, resulting in higher values of the own pay-performance sensitivity. At the median
industry concentration, own and rival pay-performance sensitivities are 8.44 and 12.20 cents
per thousand for the 4-digit SICSfor total compensation. They are 5.61 and 5.20 cents per
thousand for short-term compensation. The median regressions estimate smaller effects for
the CEO and the industry concentration variables. Thus, the main results from the OLS
regressions are supported and strengthened by the median regressions.
The optimal contracts based on the parameter estimates for the 4-digit and 3-digit SIC
specifications from Table 4 are graphed in Figures 2 and 3, respectively. In each graph, the




for both total and short-term compensation. Each of the
(66)
four curves is upward sloping, as
predicted by the differentiated Bertrand model. In both figures, the total compensation ratio
variesmore with industry concentration than does the short-term compensation ratio.21 The
greater sensitivity of the total compensation ratio to industry concentration suggests that
shareholders rely more on long-term compensation to accommodate strategic interactions
and that the incentive effects of long-term compensation are greater than those of short-
term compensation.
20The~iance-covaiance ~atr~ of the parameters and goodness of fit statistic are estimated using the
method of Koenker and Bassett (1982) and Rogers (1993), as described in StataCorp (1995).
21T0 enhance the ~aph’s readability, the curves in Figure 2 extend only through the 95th percentile of
F(H). Beyond that percentile, the compensation ratio (a/~) for total compensation increases rapidly to a
maximum value of 11.37.
36In Tables 3 and 4, we have constrained the own and rival-firm pay-performance sensitivi-
ties to be equal for CEOS and non-CEOs, allowing only their averagelevel of compensation to
differ. In Tables 5 and 6, we relax that assumption and estimate the same set of regressions
restricting the sample to only CEOS. The results are qualitatively the same w in the full
sample of executives, with larger magnitudes on all of the coefficients. The pay-performance
sensitivities will be higher in the sample of CEOS because they bear more responsibility for
decisions within the firm that affect own profits and within the industry that affect rival
profits. B~ed on the OLS estimation for total compensation, reported in Table 5a, the
own
and
and rival pay-performance sensitivities at the median industry concentration are 3.10
40.34 cents per thousand for 4-digit SICS and 10.50 and 38.44 cents per thousand for
3-digit SICS. B~ed on the median regressions (Table 6a), the median own and rival pay-
performance sensitivities are 7.25 and 41.17 cents per thousand for 4-digit SICS and 7.45
and 41.03 cents per thousand for 3-digit SICS. Thus, the main difference between the esti-
mates for CEOS and those for the full sample is a higher rival pay-performance sensitivity,
not a higher own pay-performance sensitivity y. The tests of the restriction implied by the
differentiated Bertrand model are similar to those in the full sample but offer weaker statis-
tical evidence. For the 4-digit and 3-digit SIC specifications, the restriction value is always
positive, but it is statistically significant in the OLS regressions only at median industry
concentration or below. The test still rejects the null hypothesis at a significance level below
ten percent in the corresponding median regressions.
Throughout our theoretical and empirical work, we have limited our me~ure of total
compensation to the annual flow of resources that the shareholders could have kept for
themselves had they not used it to compensate the executive. In practice, m executive also
receives incentives from the effects of her actions on the value of her holdings of stock in
37her own firm and in her rival firms. If an executive owns stock in her firm, then the total
increme in her wealth due to the performance of her firm will include not only the extra
pay she receives as part of the pay-performance sensitivity built into her compensation but
the appreciation on her personal stock holdings.22 Recognizing this, the shareholders of
her firm will incorporate a lower own-firm pay-perfomance sensitivity into her contract. If
the manager’s holdings of her rival firms’ stock were also known, then her compensation
contract would include a lower rival-firm pay-performance sensitivity as well.
The consequences of an executive’s personal wealth holdings are straightforward in our
framework. The optimal compensation contract becomes a function of both the degree of
substitutability in the product market and the executive’s holdings of her own firm and her
rivals. Conditional on a particular allocation of the executive’s personal wealth, however,
the relationship between product substitutability and the compensation ratio takes the same
form as in the model of section 2.
In order for our econometric specifications to remain valid, we would have to control for
the executive’s holdings of her own and rival firms. Since it is impossible to obtain data on
the executive’s holdings of her rival firms, we cannot modify our regressions in this way.23
In order to test for the robustness of our tidings to the incentives provided by inside
ownership, we stratify our sample into two groups of executives: those who had less than
the median wealth in their own firm at the beginning of the sample year and those who had
more than the median. We then run the regressions from Table 3a separately for each group
zzof the overall $3.25 per thousand that Jensen and Murphy (1990) estimated for the pay-performance
sensitivity, fully $2.50 was related to changes in wealth due to stockholdings. Another $0.30 waa related to
changes in wealth due to dismissal for poor performance.
2sAdditionally, ExecUCOrnp doesnot contain data on the due of stock options held at the beginning of 1993
for many of the executives in our sample. Thus, accounting for the change in the value of the executive’s
claims on her own firm would eliminate half of our sample.
38of executives. The median wealth in the executive’s own firm in our sample is approximately
$400,000.
The results of these regressions for the 4-digit SIC and 3-digit SIC specifications are
presented in Table 7. The bottom panel shows that the null hypothesis, that the restriction
implied by the differentiated Bertrand model is not satisfied, is rejected at significance levels
below five percent at the 25th percentile of industry concentration. The null hypothesis is
rejected at significance levels of approximately ten percent or below at the median concen-
tration. At the 75th percentile, the restriction value is always positive, but the p-values are
approximately 0.30 for the low ownership sample and 0.20 for the high ownership sample.
Thus, if the model had been tested only on these smaller groups, it would still be largely
supported by the data. More importantly, the middle panel shows that the comparison of
the compensation ratios across the two groups supports the predictions of the model. The
compensation ratio is higher in the subsample of executives who have low holdings of their
own firms. In the 4-digit SIC specification, the ratio is 1.5441 in the low ownership group
and 0.1080 in the high ownership group. In the 3-digit SIC specification, the ratios are
1.1643 and 0.1996.
The results presented in Table 7 support the differentiated Bertrand model in two dis-
tinct ways. First, the compensation ratio is increasing in both the low ownership and high
ownership subsamples. Second, the compensation ratio itself is greater in the low own-
ership group than in the high ownership group. In the high ownership group, executives
already receive high-powered incentives from their own personal stock holdings. They have
a correspondingly lower compensation ratio. We conclude that the empirical confirmation
of the predictions from our differentiated Bertrand model are robust to the omission of the
executive’s personal wealth from the model.
39The regressions of executive compensation on firm performance in Tables 3 through 6
provide strong empirical support for the differentiated Bertrand model derived in section 2.
Under the assumption that the Herfindahl index for a fire’s 4-digit SIC is an appropriate
proxy for the degree of product substitutability, our results show that the sensitivity of
compensation to own performance relative to rival performance decreases with the degree
of product substitutability. Based on these restits, we conclude that strategic interactions
have important effects on the structure of executive compensation.
7. Discussion
In our model, compensation contracts are used to influence the nature of competition–in the
case of Bertrand competition, to soften it. There are two major strands in the literature that
consider the effects of competition on the nature of optimal contracts. The first literature
examines the effects of product market competition on agency problems, and the second
literature analyzes the importance of competition for relative performmce evaluation.
The research of Hart (1983), Scharfstein (1988), and Hermalin (1992) considers whether
or not market competition induces managers to run their firms more efficiently by increasing
their supply of effort. Hart (1983) assumes that the manager’s utility is infinitely negative
below a certain income threshold. This implies that the manager is paid a fixed wage if
she achieves a certain profit target. In equilibrium, when competition increases, firm profits
and the manager’s wage are constant and the manager’s effort increases. The first empirical
prediction is that the own-firm pay-performance sensitivity is positive (ql + qa~(~) > O).
This prediction is borne out by the data. Second, there is no cross-sectional correlation
between industry concentration and the manager’s own-firm pay-performance sensitivity
(qs = O). This prediction is usually rejected in our empirical work. Third, there is no
40correlation between the manager’s compensation and rival firm performance (qz+ q~~(~) =
O). This prediction receives no empirical support in our data.
Scharfstein (1988) allows the manager to be risk averse (but not infinitely so) and derives
the optimal contracts when a productivity parameter is hidden information. In his model,
managerial effort, firm profits, and compensation m a share of profits all decrease when com-
petition increases. Notice that this model implies that managerial effort will decrease (not
increase) in response to an increase in competition, the opposite of Hart’s (1983) result. Our
empirical results support three cross-sectional predictions of this model: that the own-firm
pay-performance sensitivity is positive (ql + q3F(H) > O), that this sensitivity is increasing
with industry concentration (q3 > O), and that the level of compensation is increasing with
industry concentration (q5 > O). Scharfstein’s model provides no predictions regarding the
rival-firm pay-performance sensitivity. It is therefore silent on two of our more robust find-
ings; namely, that the rival-firm pay-performance sensitivity is positive (q2 + q4F(H) > O)
and increming with the degree of product market competition (q4 < O). Thus, Scharfstein’s
model cannot fully explain our empirical restits. 24
The relative performance evaluation literature, particularly the work of Lazear and Rosen
(1981), Holrnstrom (1982), and Gibbons and Murphy (1990), shows that a risk-averse man-
ager’s compensation should be insulated from common industry-wide shocks to profits. Rel-
ative performance evaluation filters out the common shock by placing a negative weight on
rival firm’s performance. This is true for evaluation of both effort and ability. For effort,
relative performance evaluation allows the principal to infer the agent’s effort choic~this is
simply an application of Holmstrom’s (1979) sficient statistic result. For ability, relative
24Hermalin (1992)gener~izes theresults of Hmt (1983) and Scharfstein (1988) by identifying several different
effects which determine whether or not increasing competition increases the manager’s effort. As Hermalin’s
resdts are ambiguous (by design), his model does not have clear empirical predictions. The results of Hart
and Scharfstein can be viewed x polar cases of Hermalin’s general setup.
41performance evaluation allows the principal to disentangle the confounding effects of noise
and infer the agent’s ability. Our finding of a significant and positive coefficient on rival
firm’s performance when explaining executive compensation is clearly inconsistent with the
predictions of the relative performance evaluation literature.
8. Conclusion
We have derived the optimal contracts in a principal-agent model of strategic competition in
which managers can be compensated on both their own profits and their rival’s (or industry)
profits. We demonstrate that when competition is differentiated Bertrand, the optimal
contract compensates the manager positively on both own and rival-firm performance. This
contract has the effect of softening competition. We show that the fraction of compensation
based on rival firm performance is increasing in the degree of competition in the industry.
The need to soften competition is highest in those industries that are most competitive. In
this case, relative performance evaluation, the natural consequence of the principal-agent
framework, would lower returns to shareholders.
When competition is Cournot, the optimal contract compensates the manager positively
on own-firm performance and negatively on rival-firm performance. This contract intensi-
fies competition and leads to one firm achieving Stackelberg leadership and the other firm
becoming a Stackelberg follower. Such contracts look very much like relative performance
evaluation, but the impetus for their use comes from the nature of competition, not an
agency problem.
Our empirical findings areconsistent with the predictions from our differentiated Bertrand
model and are inconsistent with the predictions from a standard principal-agent model, a
relative performance evaluation model, and our model of Cournot competition. Firms op-
42crating in product markets that are more competitive rely less on high-powered incentives
to compensate their managers than do firms in less competitive industries. More generally,
the magnitude of own-firm pay-performance sensitivity is explicitly linked to the magni-
tude of the rival-firm pay-performance sensitivity y. Thus, what is import ant for executive
compensation and incentives is the ratio of the pay-performance sensitivities, not the abso-
lute magnitude of either. That only this compensation ratio is identified may provide an
explanation for the widely observed low own-firm pay-performance sensitivity.
Our theoretical and empirical work also provides an explanation of the Jensen and Mur-
phy (1990) finding that relative performance pay is not an important source of managerial
incentives. If managerial decisions are strategic complements, then relative performance pay
induces managers to compete too aggressively from the shareholders’ perspective. When the
shareholders’ objective is to foster collusion, it may be more important to ignore relative per-
formance to avoid aggressive behavior rather than to use it to more clearly infer the precise
action taken by the manager. The notion that shareholders should exclude potentially useful
information (the performance of rival firms) to avoid giving the manager incentives to distort
that information shows clearly the potential cotiict between strategic competition and the
standard principal-agent trade-off of insurance and incentives.25 Our analysis shows that
providing insurance may come at the cost of not only lower effort in the production process
but detrimental levels of production itself.
Our results suggest a reinterpretation of some of the findings of Gibbons and Murphy
(1990). They motivate their use of executive pay as a way to test a more general theory
of relative performance evaluation breed on the assumption that “because CEOS tend to
ZSA related point was made by Gibbons and Murphy (1992), who axgued that basing compensation on
potentially informative accounting measures can be counterproductive because their use distracts managers
from maximizing economic profits toward maximizing the more readily observed accounting profits.
43have limited interaction with CEOS in rival firms, sabotage and collusive shirking seem un-
likely” (p. 31-S). We start from a different premise; namely, that the nature of oligopolistic
competition makes executives in rival firms interact in ways that are fundamental to the ob-
jectives of the firms’ shareholders. As Gibbons and Murphy go on to note, “Paying workers
based on relative performance instead of absolute performance distorts the worker’s incen-
tives whenever the worker can take actions that affect the average output of the reference
group” (p. 34-S). In our framework, pay based on relative performance would give the ex-
ecutive an incentive to price too aggressively in a differentiated Bertrand model, opposing
the shareholders’ objectives to soften competition. The Gibbons and Murphy result that
CEO performance is more likely to be evaluated relative to agg-regatemarket movements
than to industry movements is consistent with our model. Valu&maximizing shareholders do
not give their executives strong incentives to outperform their most immediate competition.
Within narrow industries, product market considerations are likely to dominate consider-
ations of relative performance. To the extent that shareholders provide insurance to their
executives as dictated by the standard principal-agent model, they rely more heavily on
benchmarks that do not interfere with strategic competition.
Finally, we believe that a model of executive compensation that incorporates product
market considerations can help to answer an outstanding question in the literature on in-
centives. In “A Survey of Corporate Governance,” Shleifer and Vishny (1996, p. 56) note
that:
Given the large impact of executives’ actions on values of firms, why aren’t
very high powered incentive contracts used more often in the United States and
elsewhere in the world? Is their use limited by optimal design of incentives, by
fear of self-dealing, or by distributive politics?
44The principal-agent model’s emphasis on the trade-off between incentives and insurance
ignores the importance of strategic competition in product markets to the value of the firm.
Our model predicts that product market competition is fundamental to the way shareholders
*
structure managerial incentives. Our empirical work cofirms this idea. Thus, we offer
a straightforward explanation for the infrequent use of high-powered incentives–they are
typically not optimal for shareholders.
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Proof of Proposition 1:
I c(ab+2b2 –a2)+A(a+2b)
E~l] = j 2bg _~2
E~l] > E~l] a (c(ab + 2b2– a2) + A(a + 2b)) (2b – a) – (A+ bc)(4b2 – 2a2) >0




1 –ca3–a2A–ba2c+2 abA+2ab2c+4b2A+ 4b3c E~2] = ~
b(2b2–a2)
E~2] > E~2] a (–ca3 – a2A – ba2c + 2abA + 2ab2c + 4b2A + 4b3c) (2b – a)–
4b (2b2 – a2) (A+ bc) >0









1 ca3 +a2~+a2A+ba2c–2abE– 2abA–2ab2c–4b2A –4b2E–4b3c pj=z
b(a2–2~)
E[n~] = E [(pi – c)(A – bp~ + ap~ + c)]
(






1 m3+a2E+a2A+ba2c– 2abE–2abA–2ab2c–4 b2A–4b2c–4b3c ~a
b(a2–2b2)
1 –4ab3c2+2a3bc2 –8b3Ac+4abu2 -3a2b2c2+a2u2+a2 A2+a4c2+2a3Ac+4 b4~+4b2u2+4b2A2 +6a2Abc+4abA2 — _—.
8 b(a2–2b2)
48E[7r;]– E[n~] =









E[Tj] = E [(P4 – c)(A – ~Pj + api + E)]
= ~ 16b6d+16b4A2+16b4 u2+2a5Ac+20a3b3 c2-4a3ba2-4k3A2 -6a5b#+5a4b2c2
16 (a2-2&)2b +
1 16ab3a2+16aA2b3 –10a4Abc+40a2Ab3 c–4b2a2A2–20a2b4d –4a2b2u2+a6c2+a4 A2+a4u2 –32b5Ac–16ab5&
E (a2-2b2)2b
1 16b6#+16b4A2+16b4 u2+2asAc+20a3b3 &-4a3h2-4ba3A2-6a5 b#+5a4b2# E[7r;]– E[7rz]= ~
(a2-2~)2b +
~ 16ab3u2+16aA2b3 –10a4Abc+40a2Ab3 c–4b2a2A2–20a2b4# –4a2b2a2+a6c2+a4 A2+a4u2 –32b5Ac–16ab5c2 _
16 (a2–2b2)2b
b A2-2Abc+2A ac+b2~—2bc2a+u2 +a2c2
(-2b+a)2
= ~a3 -32b4c2a+16b5c2 +16b3A2+16b3u2-8 ba2a2+8a2b3d+a3 u2+a5#+a3A2-10a4 bc2
16 (a2_z~2)2~(a–zb)2
1 3 17a3b2~–8ba2A2 –32b4Ac–18a3Abc+ 16a2Ab2c+32b3Aac+ 2a4Ac +~a
(a2-2b2)2b(a-2b)2
– &a3 (16b3+ a3 – 8ba2) ~~#~2~~2~/~~J~f >0 as b > a. —
QED
Proof of Proposition 2:
A(2b–a)+c(b–a)( 2b+a)
4b(b–a)
~ –cn3 –a2A-ba2c+2abA+ 2abzc+4bz A+4b3c
4 b(2b2–a2)
E~2] ~
4b(2b2– a2) (A(2b – a) + c(b – a)(2b + a))–
4b (b – a) (–ca3 – a2A – ba2c+ 2abA + 2ab2c+ 4b2A + 4b3c)
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16 (-b+a)b2
1 4ab3~+2a3bc2 –8b3Ac+4ah2 -3a2b2c2+a202+a2 A2+a4~+2a3Ac+4b4 $+4 b2u2+4b2A2+6a2Abc+ 4abA2 +i -
b(a2–2~)
1 3 2b3~+2bA2–3ab2~ +2a2Ac–4Ab2c+2aAh+ a3~+aA2+2h2+au2
= Ga (-b+a)b2(a2-2#)
(A+ac–bc)2+u2 , 0,
= &a3 (a + z~) (–b+a)b2(a2–2b2)
E[m;] – E[nj] =
~ czad_2czasb+2AaB c+ Aza2+~zaz –2a2Abc–3a2bzc2 –8Aa&2+8b3Ga–4u2b2 –4A2b2–4b4c2+8Ab3c
z (-b+a)bz
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~’ = 8 (a+2b)a
-p=~p=a*
QEDProof of Proposition 3
1 A+cb–ca >




(A+ cb - ca) 4b(b - a) - (2b - 2a) (A(2b - a) + c(b - a)(2b + a))
=2a(b–a) (ca–cb+A)>O,
= 4a2 (b – a) ((ca + A – cb)2 + 02) >0.
QED
Proof of Proposition 4
~;=(a–B)-
qj= a b<;:;)
E[n;] = (a – ~) ((A - C)2+ 02) ~(3a:p).
aE[7T’ ]
a.’ = ((A- c)2+~2)0* = O
aE[7r{]
ap = - ((A- C)2+a2)aa = 0.
Jointly solving both FOC’S yields:
a’=a, @=–Q’.
Substituting these contracts into quantity and profit fmctions yields:
51These quantities and profits correspond to firm 1 achieving Stackelberg leadership and
firm 2 being a Stackelberg follower. Note that neither the quantity nor the profit expressions
depend upon the contracts, so any feasible choice of contract values yields the same quantity
choices and profit levels. Lastly note that:
E[rj]= (a -p) ((A- C)2 +~2) ~(3a:p12 is undefined for a’ = O,@ = O.The same holds
true for firm 2’s profits and both quantity choices. Therefore, a G [–M, O)U (O,M],
QED
Proof of Proposition 5
~1*
= ~,~1* = –~,~1* = y,bl* = O,and a2* = a,~2* = 0,~2* = V,62* = –7-





E[7rj*] = ~ ~
~[q~*] = ;=
52These quantities andprofits correspond to firm 1 achieving Stackelberg leadership and
firm 2beinga Stackelberg follower in the first equilibrium and firm 2 achieving Stackelberg
leadership and firm 1 being a Stackelberg follower in the second equilibrium. Note that
neither the quantity nor the profit expressions depend upon the contracts, so any feasible
choice of contract values yields the same quantity choices and profit levels.
Next note that:
E[~;] = ~ (~ – P) ((A - c)’+ a’) ~(_3a7~:ffp+7p)Z is undefined for a* = O,P’ = Oand
EITil= ~(’Y -~) ((A– c)’ + ~’) ~._3a7~j~fp+Tp1Z is undefined for ~“ = O,6* = O. The
same holds true for quantity choices. Therefore, a, ~ l [–M, O)U (O,M].
QED
Proof of Proposition 6
E[T;]= ((A- C)2 +a’)
Because there is no interior maximum, the first order conditions do not characterize an
equilibrium. In order to find equilibria, we examine the extreme points for contracts.
Suppose that the manager of firm 1 chooses a = M, ~ = M. This generates payoffs of
53W{=kl+~(A+E– C)2~
w:=k2+; (A+ E–c)2; .
The manager of firm 2’s best respome then is to choose ~ as large as possible, or ~ = M,
and 6 can be arbitrary. In order to characterize an equilibrium, we must find a 15 along with
~ = M that make a = M, ~ = M the best response for the manager of firm 1. Setting
6 = –M results in a payoff to the manager of firm 1 of
W~=kI+~(A+&– C)2~.
It is immediate that a >0 in order for the manager of firm 1 to earn a positive payoff.
Further, in order for firm 1‘s quantity choice to be nonnegative, it must be the case that
a z ~ because
~; = 7 (P – ~) ~(_3a7~:;:p+7p) = –; (P – ~) *.
But the manager of firm 1’s payoff is increasing in ~, which results in a = ~ = M, which
establishes the equilibrium. In this case, the manager of firm 1 produces q? = O and the
1 A+~–c manager of tim 2 produces at the monopoly level, qj = ~~. The manager’s expected
payoffs are:
~[w;] = kl + ; ((A – C)2+ ~2) ~
~[w:] = kz + ~ ((A - C)2+ 02) ~.
As the managers share monopoly rents, this outcome cannot be improved on for the
managers. As both a and v must be positive, the other extreme point to check is a =
M, ~ = –M. Because the problem is symmetric, we have already analyzed this situation
for the manager of firm 2, and so we have found our two pure strategy equilibria. As no
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OptimalContracts Across 3-Digit sIcsTable 1
Components of Executive Compensation in 1994
Payment Catego~ First Third Standard
(Thousands of Dollars) Mean Median Quartile Quartile Deviation
CEOS (N= 1490)
Total Compensation 2019 1203 664 2301 2637
Short Term Compensation 973 719 459 1154 940
salary 515 458 323 650 278
Bonus 420 250 73 510 673
Other Annual 39 0 0 6 346
Long Term Compensation 1045 417 63 1088 2131
Restricted Stock Granted 124 0 0 0 596
Stock Options Granted 762 225 0 785 1806
LT Incentive Plan Payouts 78 0 0 0 379
All Other 81 16 5 59 353
Long-Tern Share of Total 0.350 0,350 0.100 0.545 0.259
Non-CEOs (N= 6146)
Total Compensation 836 533 311 966 1055
Short Term Compensation 454 339 226 538 453
salary 266 229 167 325 144
Bonus 174 97 31 203 354
Other Annual 14 0 0 0 99
Long Term Compensation 381 152 37 412 797
Restricted Stock Granted 51 0 0 0 316
Stock Options Granted 262 94 0 274 612
LT Incentive Plan Payouts 32 0 0 0 147
All Other 36 9 3 25 194
Long-Term Share of Total 0.321 0.309 0.119 0.480 0.230
Notes:
1) Source: Authors’ tabulations of Standard and Poor’s ExecuComp dataset.
2) The group of CEOS is comprised of the executives at each company that held tie CEO position for the
m~ority of the year. The group of Non-CEOs is comprised of the other four highest paid executives
ranked by salary plus bonus.Table 2
Average 4-digit SIC Concentration Ratios by 2-digit SIC Code, 1992
Industry Code and Description 4-fii 8-fro 20-firm 50-fm Herfindahl
20: Food and kindred products 45.5 58.8 73.8 85.7 872,8
21: Tobacco products 90.4 99.2 99.9 100.0 2120.1
22: Textile mill products 36.6 51.3 70.8 88.1 635.6
23: Apparel and other textile products 29.0 39.2 54.5 70,9 486.1
24: Lmber and wmd producw 21.4 29.9 42.3 54,8 223.5
25: Furniture and futures 29.3 40.0 54.1 68,9 405.6
26: Paper and allied products 36,4 53.3 74.6 88.0 590.8
27: Printing and publishing 21.9 31.0 43.8 56.0 305.6
28: Chemi@ and allied products 38,1 52,7 72.9 88.2 688.2
29: Petroleum and cord products 30.3 48.8 76.8 95.4 417.9
30: Rubber and miscellaneous plastic products 21.6 30.4 41.3 53.9 318.9
31: Leather and leather products 41.2 57.6 78.2 92.6 740.3
32: Stone clay and glass products 36.7 48,0 61.3 71.9 733.6
33: Primary metal indushies 37.5 53.8 73.3 87.9 640.2
34: Fabricated metal products 26.4 34.8 47.8 61.5 387.0
35: Industrial machinery and equipment 34.8 46.3 61,6 73.2 565.0
36: Eleckonic and other elechic equipment 42.9 56.5 71.1 82.6 763.9
37: Transportation equipment 69.4 80.0 89.2 93.1 1979.0
38: Insments and related products 37.4 50.6 68.6 82.4 724.0
39: Miscellaneous manufacturing industries 25.8 35.5 48.9 62.2 425.8
Notes:
1) Source: Authors’ tabulations of 1992 Census of Manufactures Concentration Ratio Series.
2) Each entry is the weighted average of the concentration memure for all the 4-digit SICS in each 2-digit
SICS. The weighw used are tie 4-digit SICS’ value of shipments.Table 3a
OLS Regressions of Pay-Performance Sensitivity-All Executiv=
Dependent Variable: Total Compensation
Definition of Rival Firms (SIC level) -—. -— ---- -------- !
Regression Coefficients 4-digit 3-digit 2-digit
Own Perf-ante (q,) 0.0011 -0.0080 0.0856
(0.0329) (0.0314) (0.0317)
Rival Performance (q) 0.3266 0.3586 0,5983
(0.0288) (0.0296) (0.0457)
Own Performance x 0.0792 0.1234 -0.0896
Herf. Percentile (q,) (0.0446) (0.0414) (0.0436)
Rival Performance x -0.3410 -0.3928 -0.5044
Herf. Percentile (q,) (0.0393) (0.0422) (0.0514)
Herfiidahl Percend.le 380.7444 440.8085 406.8353
(69.4374) (60.6037) (61.4954)
CEO Indicator 1050.9820 1055.1290 1062.5370
(38.8489) (36.3996) (37.0404)
Adjusted R-squared 0,1721 0.1753 0.1822
Number of Observations 5548 6290 6451
Pay-Performance
Sensitivities (Median) —- .—
Own Performance 0.0407 0.0537 0.0408
Rival Performance 0.1561 0,1622 0.3461
Test of Bertrand Model
Herf. Perwntile = 0.25
Restriction Value (R) 0.4504 0.6062 -0.0467
Tat Statistic (W) 15.4154 36.4833 0,5445
P-Value O.0001 0,0000 0.4606
Herf. Perwntile = 0.50
Restriction Value (R) 1.0767 1.5622 -0.0870
Test Statistic (W) 11.7095 21.5192 0.5615
P-Value 0.0006 0.0000 0.4537
Herf. Percentile = 0.75
Resrnction Value (R) 5.2245 10.0320 -0.2151
Test Statistic ~ 4.3494 4.0i)16 0.5994
P-Value 0.0370 0.0455 0.4388
Notes:
1) Sourw: Authors’ estimates from ExecuComp and Census of Manufactures datasets.
2) All dollar values are in thousands (compensation) or millions (performanm) of constant 1994 dollars.
3) All regressions include dummy variables for 2-digit SIC code, year (=1994), and year -SIC intmctions.
4) Standard errors are in parentheses.Table 3b
OLS Regressions of Pay-Performance Sensitivity--All Executives
Dependent Variable: Short-Tern Compensation
Definition of Rival Firms (SIC level) ----------------- --------------------------- ----------------------------
Regression Coefficients 4-digit 3-digit 2-digit
Own Performance (q,) 0.0246 0.0159 0,0250
(0.0126) (0.0122) (0.0117)
Rival Performance (q~ 0.0775 0.0971 0,2765
(0.0111) (0.0115) (0,0168)
Own Performance x 0.0150 0,0319 -0.0220
Herf. Percentile (q~) (0.0172) (0.0161) (0.0161)
Rival Performance x -0.0729 -0.0896 -0,2328
Herf. Percentile (q,) (0.0151) (0.0164) (0.0189)
Herfiidahl Percentile 141.8921 160.4588 170,6416
(26.6945) (23.5536) (22.6366)
CEO Indicator 490.5205 490,9335 498.9335
(14.9351) (14.1467) (13.6347)
Adjusted R-squared 0.2135 0.2145 0.2572
Number of Observations 5548 6290 6451
Pay-Performance
Sensitivities (Median) -----------------------
Own Performance 0.0321 0.0319 0.0140
Rival Performance 0.0411 0.0523 0.1601
Test of Bertrand Model -----------------------
Herf. Percentile = 0.25
Restriction Value (R) 0.8409 0.0104 -0.0057
Test Statistic (W) 14.5693 26.7640 0.0134
P-Value 0,0001 0,0000 0.9077
Herf. Percentile = 0.50
Resrnction Value (R) 1.7534 1.6540 -0.0106
Test Statistic ~ 9.1817 14,8268 0.0135
P-Value 0,0024 0,0001 0.9076
Herf. Percentile = 0.75
Restriction Value (R) 5,6724 5,0663 -0.0261
Test Statistic (W) 3.1017 4.3516 0.0136
P-Value 0.0782 0.0370 0.9072
Notti:
1) Source: Authors’ estimates from ExecuComp and Census of Manufactures dataseK.
2) All doUar values are in thousands (compensation) or millions (performance) of constant 1994 dollars.
3) All regressions include dummy variables for 2-digit SIC code, year (=1994), and year -SIC interactions.
4) Standard errors are in parentheses.Table 4a
Median Regressions of Pay-Performance Sensitivity--All Executives
Dependent Variable: Total Compensation
Definition of Rival Firms (SIC level)
--------------------------------- ------- ------------------------------- .
Regression Coefficients 4-digit 3-digit 2-digit
Own Performance (ql) 0.0326 0.0444 0.0181
(0.0141) (0.0160) (0.0134)
Rival Performance (q) 0.2312 0.2448 0.6450
(0.0119) (0.0150) (0.0194)
Own Performance x 0.1035 0.0634 0.0385
Herf, Percentile (q,) (0.0192) (0.0211) (0.0184)
Rival Performance x -0.2184 -0.1840 -0.5340
Herf. Percentile (rId) (0.0164) (0.0214) (0.0217)
Herfindahl Percentile 185.9681 218,9738 246.9087
(29.7925) (30.8268) (26.0619)
CEO Indicator 684.0739 676.0314 676.0100
(16.7154) (18.5105) (15.7292)
Pseudo R-squared 0.1224 0.1263 0.1457
Number of Observations 5548 6290 6451
Pay-Performance
Sensitivities (Median) -----------------------
Own Performance 0.0844 0.0761 0.0374
Rival Performance 0,1220 0.1528 0.3780
Test of Bertrand Model .-—---- ---------------
Herf. Percentile = 0.25
Restriction Value (R) 0.9958 0.5995 0.1328
Test Statistic (W) 149.4704 60.6188 32.5208
P-Value 0.000o 0,0000 0.0000
Herf. Percentile = 0.50
Restriction Value (R) 2.0867 1.0147 0,2432
Test Statistic ~ 91.4639 38.9581 30,2827
P-Value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Herf. Percentile = 0.75
Restriction Value (R) 6.8376 2.0768 0.5814
Test Statistic (W) 26.2689 18.1124 25.7950
P-Value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Notes:
1) Source: Authors’ estimates from ExecuComp and Census of Manufactures &tmeE.
2) All dollar values are in thousands (compensation) or millions (performance) of constant 1994 dollars,
3) Ml regressions include dummy variables for 2-digit SIC code, year (=1994), and year -SIC interactions.
4) Standard errors are in parentheses.Table 4b
Median Regressions of Pay-Performance Sensitiviu--All Executives
Dependent Variable: Short-Term Compensation
Definition of Rival Fms (SIC level) -------------------------- ----------------------- ---------------------- -
Regression Coefficients 4-digit 3-digit 2-digit
Own Performance (q,) 0.0430 0.0395 0,0070
(0.0078) (0.0058) (0,0060)
Rival Performance (TJ 0.0820 0.1083 0,3780
(0.0068) (0.0055) (0.0087)
Own Performance x 0.0262 0.0140 0.0190
Her-f.Percentile (q,) (0.0105) (0.0076) (0.0083)
Rival Performance x -0.0601 -0.0682 -0,3202
Herf. Percentile (qi) (0.0093) (0.0078) (0.0098)
Herfindahl Percentile 53.5549 94.1495 140.7327
(16.5096) (11.2027) (11,7072)
CEO hdicator 365.9972 375,0572 379.3934
(9.2414) (6.7386) (7.0599)
Pseudo R-squared 0.1504 0.1537 0.1880
Number of Observations 5548 6290 6451
Pay-Performance
Sensitivities (Median) -------------------- ---
Own Performance 0.0561 0.0465 0.0165
Rival Performance 0.0520 0.0742 0,2179
Test of Bertrand Mcdel -----------------------
Herf. Percentile = 0.25
Restriction Value (R) 1.0543 0.5050 0,1064
Test Statistic (W) 60,6770 51.8517 35.9514
P-Value O,oooo 0.0000 0.0000
Herf. Percentile = 0.50
Restriction Value (R) 1,7523 0.7639 0.1989
Test Statistic M 35.7868 35.8187 33.8907
P-Value 0,0000 0,0000 0.0000
Herf. Percentile = 0.75
Restriction Value (R) 3.4681 1,2881 0.4969
Test Statistic ~ 15.0339 20.8462 29.6171
P-Value O.0001 0,0000 0.0000
Notes:
1) Source: Authors’ estimates from ExecuComp and Census of Manufactures damets.
2) All dollar values are in thousands (compensation) or millions (performance) of constant 1994 dollars.
3) All regressions include dummy variables for 2-digit SIC code, year (=1994), and year -SIC interactions.
4) Standard errors are in parentheses. ITable 5a
OLS Regressions of Pay-Performance Sensitivity--Just CEOS
Dependent Variable: Total Compensation
Definition of Rival Firms (SIC level) ------------------------- -------------- -------------------------------- .
Regression Coefficients 4-digit 3-digit 2-digit
Own Performance (q,) -0,0887 -0.0749 0.1872
(0.1467) (0.1397) (0.1374)
Rival Performance (q~ 0.9173 0.9728 1.4649
(0.1248) (0.1293) (0.2055)
Own Performance x 0.2394 0.3597 -0.2554
Herf. Percentile (T13) (0.1961) (0.1839) (0.1842)
Rival Performance x -1.0279 -1,1769 -1.2262
Herf. Percentile (q,) (0.1731) (0.1847) (0.2269)
Hefimdahl Percentile 782.5208 907.4696 833.5662
(287.6328) (250,3627) (249.4382)
Adjusted R-squared 0.0887 0.0934 0.1103
Number of Observations 1075 1223 1252
Pay-Performance
Sensitivities Median) -----------------------
Own Performance 0.0310 0.1050 0.0595
Rival Performance 0.4034 0.3844 0,8518
Test of Bertrand Model -----------------------
Herf. Percentile = 0.25
Restriction Value (R) 0.2945 0.5683 -0,1077
Test Statistic (W) 2.9795 10,8127 1.0363
P-Value 0.0843 0,0010 0.3087
Herf. Percentile = 0,50
Restriction Value (R) 0.7894 1,7715 -0.1992
Test Statistic (W) 2.3176 5.8648 1.1175
P-Value 0.1279 0.0154 0.2905
Herf. Percentile = 0,75
Restriction Value (R) 5.9927 32.2210 -0.4862
Test Statistic (W) 0.7985 0,4554 1.3056
P-Value 0.3715 0.4998 0.2532
Notes:
1) Source: Authors’ estimates from ExecuComp and Census of Manufactures datasets.
2) All dollar values are in tiousands (compensation) or millions (performance) of constant 1994 dollars.
3) All regressions include dummy variables for 2-digit SIC code, year (=1994), and year -SIC interactions.
4) Standard errors are in parentheses.Table 5b
OLS Regressions of Pay-Perfomce Sensitivity--Just CEOS
Dependent Variable: Short-Term Compensation
Definition of Rival Firms (SIC level) -------------------- --------------- ---------- ---------- ------- ----------
Regression Coefficients 4-digit 3-digit 2-digit
Own Performance (q,) 0.0444 0.0154 0.0354
(0.0561) (0.0533) (0,0502)
Rival Performance (q~ 0.1513 0.2244 0.6117
(0.0477) (0.0493) (0.0750)
Own Performance x 0.0495 0.1096 -0.0358
Herf. Percentile (qq) (0.0750) (0.0701) (0.0673)
Rival Performance x -0.1696 -0.2650 -0.5117
Herf, Permntile (q,) (0.0662) (0.0705) (0.0829)
Herfindahl Percentile 248.5546 286.1645 308.5381
(109,9891) (95,4908) (91.1006)
Adjusted R-squared 0.0553 0,0670 0.1338
Number of Observations 1075 1223 1252
Pay-Performance
Sensitivities (Median) -----------------------
Own Performance 0.0692 0.0702 0,0175
Rival Performance 0.0665 0.0919 0.3559
Test of Befiand Model .- —---- ---------------
Herf. Per&ntile = 0,25
Restriction Value (R) 1.2652 1.1464 -0.0161
Test Statistic ~ 3.7981 8,8535 0.0336
P-Value 0.0513 0.0035 0.8546
Herf. Percentile = 0.50
Restriction Value (R) 3.3912 3.3962 -0.0298
Test Statistic (W) 1,8797 3,6486 0.0339
P-Value 0.1704 0.0561 0.8538
Herf. Percentile = 0.75
Restriction Value (R) 25,7655 43.6778 -0.0726
Test Statistic (W) 0,2608 0.2666 0.0347
P-Value 0,6096 0.0656 0.8522
Notes:
1) Source: Authors’ esdmates from ExecuComp and Census of Manufactures datasets.
2) All dollar values are in thousands (compensation) or millions (performance) of constant 1994 dollars.
3) All regressions include dummy variables for 2-digit SIC code, year (=1994), and year -SIC interactions.
4) Standard errors are in parentheses.Table 6a
Median Regressions of Pay-Perfomance Sensitivity--Just CEOS
Dependent Variable: Total Compensation
Definition of Rival Firms (SIC level) --------------------- -------------------- -------- ------- -------- --------
Re~ession Coefficients 4-digit 3-digit 2-digit
Own Performance (q,) -0.1392 -0.1788 0.2972
(0.0897) (0.0798) (0.0816)
Rival Performance (q~ 0.9277 0.9311 1.4945
(0.0627) (0.0588) (0.1222)
Own Performance x 0.4233 0.5065 -0.4504
Herf. Percentile (qj) (0.1184) (0,1063) (0.1060)
Rival Performance x -1.0321 -1.0416 -1,1098
Herf. Percentile (q,) (0.0861) (0.0892) (0.1328)
Herfiidahl Percentile 556.4237 550.0742 507,2946
(186.7733) (151.1471) (150.8538)
Pseudo R-squared 0.0810 0.0846 0.1122
Number of Observations 1075 1223 1252
Pay-Perfomce
Sensitivities (Median) --------------- _______-
Own Performance 0.0725 0.0745 0.0720
Rival Performance 0.4117 0.4103 0.9396
Test of Bertrand Model ----------------- ------
Herf. Percentile = 0.25
Resrnction Value (R) 0.5552 0.6345 -0.2318
Test Statistic ~ 26,7698 44.0755 12.7968
P-Value O.0000 0.0000 0,0003
Herf. Percentile = 0.50
Restriction Value (R) 1.4693 1.6957 -0.3889
Test Statistic (W) 17,5853 22.6238 14.9636
P-Value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001
Herf. Percentile = 0.75
Restriction Value (R) 10.5504 12.7090 -0.7831
Test Statistic (W) 3.9016 3.2564 19.4778
P-Value 0.0482 0.0711 0.0000
Notes:
1) SourW: Authors’ estimates from ExecuComp and Census of Manufactures datasets.
2) All dollar vaIues are in thousands (compensation) or millions (performance) of constant 1994 dollars.
3) All regressions include dummy variables for 2-digit SIC code, year (=1994), and year -SIC interactions,
4) Standard errors are in parentheses..
Table 6b
Median Regressions of Pay-Perfonnan@ Sensitivity--Just CEOS
Dependent Variable: Short-Term Compensation
Deftition of Rival Fms (SIC level) -. ——-- ——----——.——- —- —-—-—- —----- —----------—.
Regression Coefficients 4-digit 3digit 2-digit
Own Performance (q,) 0.0386 0.0428 0.0015
(0.0337) (0.0286) (0.0255)
Rival Performance (q~ 0.2383 0.2869 0.8318
(0.0281) (0.0268) (0.0389)
Own Performanu x 0.0941 0.0852 0.0448
Herf. Percentile (qJ) (0,0452) (0.0378) (0.0342)
Rival Performance x -0.2206 -0.2620 -0.7161
Herf. Percentile (q,) (0.0394) (0.0379) (0.0430)
Herfindahl Percendle 178.7747 191,9988 316.8628
(66.7151) (51.6181) (46.6178)
Pseudo R-squared 0.0859 0.0942 0.1459
Nnmkr of Observations 1075 1223 1252 -
Pay-Performance
Sensitivities (Median) ——-——- —— —--
Own Performance 0.0857 0.0854 0.0239
Rival Performance 0.1280 0.1559 0.4738
Test of Bertrand Model —--—c
Herf. Permntile = 0.25
Restriction Value (R) 0.9228 0,7274 0,0900
Test Statistic ~ 25.2M1 34.1367 8.0005
P-Value O.0000 0.0000 0,0047
Herf. Percentile = 0.50
Restriction Value (R) 1.8898 1.4669 0.1708
Twt Statistic ~ 14.3681 19.1068 7.5615
P-Value 0,0002 0.0000 0.0060
Herf. Percentile = 0.75
Restriction Value (R) 5.8376 4.3612 0.4414
Test Statistic (W) 4.4410 6.2163 6.6364
P-Value 0.0351 0.0127 0.0100
Notre:
1) SourW: Authors’ estimates from ExecuComp and Census of Manufactures datasets.
2) All dollar values are in thousands (compensadon) or millions (performance) of constant 1994 dollars.
3) All regressions include dummy variables for 2-digit SIC code, year (=1994), and year -SIC interactions.
4) Standard errors are in parentheses.Table 7
OLS Regressions of Pay-Perfomance Sensitivity by Inside Ownership--AU Executives
Dependent Variable: Total Compensation
Rival Definition is 4-digit SIC Rival Definition is 3-digit SIC
------------------------ --------------------- -------------------------- .
Regression Coefficients Low Ownership High Ownership Low Ownership High Ownership
Own Performance (q,) 0.1036 -0.0267 0.0984 -0.0499
(0.0299) (0.0566) (0.0297) (0,0541)
Rival Performance (q) 0.1053 0.4394 0.1363 0.4834
(0.0243) (0.0548) (0.0259) (0,0555)
Own Performance x -0.0249 0,0967 -0.0197 0,1811
Herf. Percentile (rI,) (0.0408) (0,0763) (0.0391) (0,0710)
Rival Performance x -0.0926 -0.4771 -0.1203 -0,5590
Herf. Percentile (q,) (0.0333) (0.0736) (0.0374) (0.0775)
Herfiidahl Percentie 138,5964 537.3100 241.5123 608.9089
(53.8749) (144.7219) (50.4860) (123,0363)
CEO Indicator 810.8182 964.9900 818.8994 975.8305
(55,0736) (66.3131) (53.1970) (61.4254)
Adjusted R-squared 0.1581 0.1326 0.1532 0.1393
Number of Observations 2461 2463 2798 2799
Pay-Performance
Sensitivities (Median) -----------------------
Own Performance 0.0911 0,0217 0.0886 0.0407
Rival Performance 0,0590 0.2009 0.0761 0.2039
Test of Bertrand Model .---- —- ---------------
Herf. Percentile = 0.25
Restriction Vrdue (R) 1.0329 0.2904 0.8123 0.5054
Test Statistic (W) 4.3476 4.3940 5.3763 16.8961
P-Value 0.0371 0.0361 0.0204 0.0000
Herf. Percentile = 0.50
Restriction Value (R) 2.0031 0.7376 1.5809 1.4355
Test Statistic m 2.6346 3.7177 3.1267 10.6629
P-Value 0.1046 0.0538 0.0770 0.0011
Herf. Percentile = 0.75
Restriction Value (R) 5.4290 4.4713 4,3203 14.5009
Test Statistic (W) 1.0526 1.6512 1,2023 1,5121
P-Value 0.3049 0.1988 0.2729 0,2188
Notes:
1) Source: Authors’ estimates from ExecuComp and Census of Manufactures datasets.
2) All dollar values are in thousands (compensation) or millions (performance) of constant 1994 dollars.
3) All regressions include dummy variables for 2-digit SIC code, year (=1994), and year -SIC interactions.
4) Standard errors are in parentheses,